

# CHAPTER 6

## REASONABLENESS AND ARTICLE 8(4)

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### **Article 8(4): Examination of communications**

When examining communications under the present Protocol, the Committee shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party in accordance with part II of the Covenant. In doing so, the Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant.

## **1 Introduction**

Article 8(4) is arguably the heart and pulse of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR).<sup>1</sup> It is a unique provision that introduces a substantive criterion of ‘reasonableness’, not contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and which was developed in response to the central problematic and historic debates regarding the justiciability of economic, social, and cultural (ESC) rights claims. It provides direction as to how the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or Committee) should adjudicate claims of violations resulting from States’ failures to adopt reasonable measures to realise Covenant rights, and addresses the critical relationship between individual communications and broader issues of socio-economic policy. At the same time as responding constructively to traditional concerns about the adjudication of ESC rights claims, Article 8(4) also remains true to the broader purpose of the OP-ICESCR, which is to provide access to justice and ensure fair and competent adjudication of claims engaging all violations of ESC rights. The result of years of debate, Article 8(4) reflects a hard-won consensus. It affirms that access to justice, in cases where ESC rights violations are linked to failures by States to adopt positive measures,

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1 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (63<sup>rd</sup> session, 2008), U.N. Doc A/RES/63/117 (2008).

requires a robust standard of review of the steps taken by the State Party to realise Covenant rights, based on reliable evidence from a wide range of sources and a clear demarcation of the adjudicative role of the Committee from the policy design and implementation role of the State.

Understood within the context of its drafting history and the debates surrounding the Open-Ended Working Group mandated to draft the OP-ICESCR, Article 8(4) should be read as a clear rejection of attempts to limit the justiciability of claims relating to the substantive obligations of realising rights under Article 2(1), or to demarcate particular spheres of State policy-making for greater deference or a reduced level of scrutiny. Article 8(4) aims to ensure that claims under the OP-ICESCR actually provide a new impetus for resolving systemic violations of ESC rights linked to poverty and social exclusion, at the same time as ensuring that individual claimants receive full and fair hearings according to their individual circumstances. Recognising the valuable role of individual rights claims in bringing to light the dignity interests and human rights values at stake in socio-economic policy choices lays the groundwork for a new dialectic between rights claims, and policy design and implementation. The true effectiveness and transformative potential of the OP-ICESCR will, to a great extent, depend, on how the Committee interprets and applies the directives contained in 8(4) to this dialectic.

Concerns surrounding the creation of an ICESCR complaints mechanism comparable to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) have historically focused on the potential for alleged violations of the ICESCR to engage with positive obligations on States to comply with Article 2(1) of the ICESCR: the duty to 'take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures'.<sup>2</sup> Similar concerns also predominated during the debates over the OP-ICESCR at the Open-Ended Working Group. States opposed to the drafting of an Optional Protocol at the outset argued that the positive obligations on governments to adopt programmes, enact legislation, and allocate resources necessary to implement rights in a manner that is commensurate with institutional and economic capacity are suited to a periodic review procedure – based on a dialogue between independent experts and State delegations – rather than to human rights adjudication by way of an individual petition procedure. In subsequent debates about the scope of the OP-ICESCR and the standard of review, a central issue was whether approaches to formal adjudication of individual civil and political rights claims could be applied to adjudicating ESC rights claims. States and organisations supportive of a comprehensive Optional Protocol argued for a less restrictive approach to rights adjudication, in

2 Ibid, Article 2(1).

which not only discrete State actions would be reviewable, but also more general failures to act to implement policies and enact legislation necessary for the realisation of rights. The primary hurdle to drafting and implementing an OP-ICESCR was, therefore, not simply to extend dominant models of judicial review and rights adjudication developed in the civil and political rights arena into the socio-economic domain, but to reconceptualise adjudication so as to do justice to claims in a new terrain.

The relative dominance of civil and political rights in human rights litigation has encouraged a particular approach to rights adjudication. Traditional approaches to the adjudication of civil and political rights have tended to limit the role of adjudicators to reviewing State action by determining whether particular provisions or actions violate individual rights. Courts and other adjudicative bodies have thus been viewed primarily as referees of State action, charged with deciding whether particular actions are 'out of bounds' or contrary to the rules. This prevailing paradigm has made courts and human rights bodies reluctant to engage with human rights violations linked to the failure of States to legislate or act in order to protect or ensure rights or to advance the broader transformative goals of social and economic human rights.<sup>3</sup>

This negative rights bias has distorted human rights adjudication in the direction of those rights claimants whose rights have been infringed by State actions, at the expense of those whose rights require positive measures, such as those living in poverty or without adequate food, housing, or access to healthcare or education. ESC rights violations, of course, do not always result from failures to take positive measures to realise rights as required under Article 2(1). They may also result from discrete and identifiable State action, such as forced evictions or discriminatory exclusion of disadvantaged groups from socio-economic benefits. Similarly, civil and political rights violations may result from failures of States to take positive measures to ensure an independent judiciary, fair trials within a reasonable time, or to remove obstacles to equality and non-discrimination facing disadvantaged groups. It is now well accepted that the positive/negative rights dichotomy is not a viable or coherent distinction between ESC rights and civil and political rights. Nevertheless, the historic step forward in the adoption of a comprehensive OP-ICESCR lies in the recognition that adjudication and remedies must be made available for violations of ESC rights resulting from the failure of States to meet their obligations as articulated in Article 2(1). Achieving that purpose meant directly confronting a prevailing bias in favour of negative rights-oriented adjudication and challenging those who wished to restrict the scope of the OP-ICESCR to the more traditional types of

3 Bruce Porter, 'Inclusive Interpretations: Social and Economic Rights and the Canadian Charter' in Helena Alviar Garcia, Karl Klare and Lucy Williams (eds.), *Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014).

claims. The challenge facing the drafters of the OP-ICESCR was to correct the bias of prevailing rights adjudication in order to engage directly with violations emanating from State failures to take appropriate measures, while at the same time maintaining a clear distinction between the adjudicative role of courts or human rights bodies, on the one hand, and the role of States to enact policy and implement programmes, on the other. Article 8(4) is the response of the drafters to this challenge.

Many of the most critical violations of ESC rights, affecting the most marginalised of groups, result from States' failures to comply with the obligation to take appropriate measures to realise Covenant rights by putting into place plans, policies, and programmes that will implement rights over time. The ability of the Committee to adjudicate and remedy claims addressing these serious systemic violations under the OP-ICESCR is thus critical to ensuring access to justice for victims of the most widespread and egregious violations. If the OP-ICESCR were to focus primarily on challenges to discrete provisions, such as discriminatory exclusions from existing social programmes or State action leading to homelessness through forced evictions, and leave the decisions regarding the adoption of legislative or programmatic responses to widespread hunger and poverty to the broad discretion of States, the OP-ICESCR would only provide access to justice for complaints that generally fall within the scope of existing civil and political rights complaints mechanisms. The critical exclusions of ESC rights from adjudication that the adoption of the OP-ICESCR was designed to correct would be allowed to continue. Committing to a comprehensive approach that enables rights claimants to address these systemic issues, however, raised inevitable questions about how to ensure competent and effective adjudication of complex policy issues.

The years of debate over the drafting of the OP-ICESCR ultimately produced a consensus that a procedure designed to ensure access to justice for victims of violations of ESC rights must place squarely within its scope the violations of rights that emanate from States' failures to adopt positive measures to realise rights including, where appropriate, legislative measures and budgetary allocations. The idea of incorporating a reference to a standard of review for the assessment of compliance with Article 2(1) may have originated, at least for some States, from a scepticism about the justiciability of obligations of progressive realisation, but in the end 8(4) served the opposite purpose – to affirm that positive measures to implement ESC rights were very much within the proper scope and purview of the new complaints procedure. Article 8(4) recognises the importance of this aspect of the Committee's new mandate and gives direction to the Committee about how it should assess compliance with the substantive obligations under Article 2(1) in the context of the examination of communications.

## **2 The Drafting History of Article 8(4)**

### **2.1 The Comprehensiveness Challenge**

The wording of Article 8(4) was a product of final day negotiations, at which time the question of the proper standard of review with respect to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR threatened to dissolve consensus over the final draft. The resolution achieved under the pressure of final negotiations, however, drew on a long process of debate, discussion, clarification, and consensus building.

Discussions at the Open-Ended Working Group surrounding the drafting of the Optional Protocol invariably circled around the issue of the justiciability of claims engaging with States' positive obligations under Article 2(1). It became clear early on that States that were either hostile to, or sceptical about, the justiciability of ESC rights would play a significant role in the negotiations, even though the governments in power at that time had no intention of ratifying the OP-ICESCR. States such as the USA, China, Canada, Australia, and the UK waged their battle against justiciability in three stages: First, they opposed the project of drafting a complaints procedure for the ICESCR, arguing that the focus should be on periodic review; second, after it had become clear that an OP-ICESCR would be drafted, they attempted to limit the scope of the Committee's adjudication under any complaints procedure to more traditional areas of civil and political rights adjudication, such as non-discrimination, or by providing ratifying States with the option of identifying what components of the ICESCR would be covered; and finally, after consensus formed for a comprehensive approach that would not allow for the exclusion of particular rights or components of rights, they advocated for a reduced level of scrutiny and a general deference to States' policy choices in the adjudication of communications engaging Article 2(1) and other positive obligations linked to budgetary allocations or legislative measures.<sup>4</sup>

The first meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group in 2004 made it clear that the adoption of a comprehensive complaints procedure ensuring access to justice for violations of ESC rights was far from assured. Some delegations expressed doubts as to whether all ESC rights were equally justiciable. The tripartite typology of obligations, according to which States Parties have an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil ESC rights was frequently invoked as a possible basis for limiting the scope of the complaints procedure by excluding at least some components of the

4 Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists, 'Commentary on the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' English edition, 2010 at 81, available at: <http://www.crin.org/docs/ENG-CommentaryOP-ICESCR.pdf>.

obligations to fulfil from the scope of the procedure.<sup>5</sup> Concerns were expressed by some States about possible interference with budget decisions and policy-making,<sup>6</sup> and others questioned the Committee's competence to review States' social policy to determine violations.<sup>7</sup> A number of delegations proposed an à la carte approach that would allow each State to select only those rights or components of rights that it considered justiciable.<sup>8</sup> Many other delegations, however, favoured a comprehensive approach, arguing from the outset that an Optional Protocol should cover all substantive rights contained in the Covenant, and expressing concern that proposals for limiting the scope of the Optional Protocol would deny effective remedies to victims of the most serious violations.<sup>9</sup> It was clear that if the Working Group were to proceed with drafting at that time, there was a serious risk of an OP-ICESCR that severely limited the mandate of the Committee to engage with the most substantive claims engaging obligations under Article 2(1).

## 2.2 The Emergence of Reasonableness

A fresh breeze of hope was felt at the second session of the Working Group held in 2005. At the outset of the meeting, Louise Arbour, the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights, spoke to the prevailing concerns that threatened this project, about which she had expressed a strong personal commitment. Drawing on her experience as a judge, including as a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, she introduced the concept of reasonableness as a potential resolution to the impasse confronting the Working Group on the issue of justiciability of positive measures, in a manner that drew on familiar concepts from civil and political rights adjudication:

From my own experience of working with courts and tribunals, I know how delicate the issue of separation of powers can be and how important it is to

- 5 Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *Report of the first session* (First session, 2004), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2004/44 at paras. 57-66 (2004).
- 6 *Ibid.*, para. 22.
- 7 Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *Report of the second session* (Second session, 2005), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2005/52, para. 32 (2005).
- 8 Working Group, *Report of the first session* (n. 5 above), at paras 24 and 65; Working Group, *Report of the second session* (n. 7 above), at paras. 15, 17, 87, 101-2, 109; Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *Report of the third session*, (Third session, 2006), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/47 at paras. 30 and 111 (2006); Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *Report of the fourth session* (Fourth session, 2007), U.N. Doc A/HRC/6/8 at paras. 36-7 (2007); Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *Report of the fifth session* (Fifth session, 2008), U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/7 at paras. 9, 146 and 226 (2008).
- 9 UNCESCR, *Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its first session* (n. 5 above), at paras. 65-6.

acknowledge the connections between legal and political processes without blurring the lines that must separate them. However, reviewing claims related to social, economic and cultural rights is not fundamentally different from the functions involved in the review of petitions concerning other rights. As for normal judicial review functions, the key is often in examining the 'reasonableness' of measures adopted by each State – given its specific resources and circumstances – by reference to objective criteria that are developed in accordance with standard judicial experience and with the accumulation of jurisprudence. A petition system at the international level can help provide guidance for the reasonable interpretation of universal norms in the provision of remedies at the domestic level. In many cases, it can also serve to establish if there is already the effective or appropriate implementation of existing laws and policies, rather than to determine the reasonableness of such laws and policies.<sup>10</sup>

The High Commissioner returned to the theme of reasonableness in subsequent addresses to the Open Ended Working Group. In 2006, she explained to delegates that issues of budgetary allocation are not beyond the competence of courts or adjudicative bodies to review, suggesting that the Covenant 'requires States to use limited resources "reasonably" and in a non-discriminatory manner' – and to be held accountable for doing so.

The concept of 'reasonableness' of State action is a well-known legal concept and long used in adjudication of civil and political rights. The growing body of jurisprudence at the national and regional levels illustrates that it can be similarly employed to assess the extent to which States respect their obligations in the area of economic, social and cultural rights. Such rights might not be fully achievable for all on an immediate basis, yet they remain rights. The obligations of States in this domain can be fully enforced while taking into account their resource constraints – and judges have an important role to play in this regard.<sup>11</sup>

The approach suggested by the High Commissioner resonated with emerging domestic jurisprudence from South Africa and elsewhere. Subsequent discussions at the Open-Ended Working Group, and in various other fora on the justiciability of ESC rights, focused more attention on the reasonableness approach proposed by the High Commissioner and others, and began to generate more support for the drafting of a complaints procedure. Growing support for recognising the justiciability of ESC rights led the Human Rights Council, in June of 2006, to change the mandate of the Open-Ended Working Group to commence negotiating the text of an Optional Protocol.

10 Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement by Ms. Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Open-Ended Working Group established by the Commission on Human Rights to consider options regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Second session, 2005).

11 Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement by Ms. Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights to the third session of the Open-Ended WG OP-ICESCR (Third session, 2006).

In response to the new mandate, the Chairperson convened a meeting of international experts and, on the basis of their advice, prepared a first draft of an Optional Protocol for the consideration of the Open-Ended Working Group. It was in this draft that a reasonableness standard was first proposed:

When examining communications under the present Protocol concerning Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, the Committee will assess the reasonableness of the steps taken by the State Party, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means.<sup>12</sup>

At this stage of the process, however, there was still no consensus in support of a comprehensive approach to the complaints procedure.<sup>13</sup> The States opposed to the OP-ICESCR continued to press on all fronts to limit justiciability. A provision remained in square brackets in the text providing for à la carte options<sup>14</sup> to permit States not only to exclude particular rights from the complaints procedure, but also to exclude the obligations to progressively realise rights as set out in Article 2(1).<sup>15</sup> A parallel campaign was initiated by the opposing States to weaken the standard of reasonableness review proposed in the Chairperson's first draft.<sup>16</sup> States such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, China and the United States advocated for the inclusion of a reference to 'a broad margin of appreciation' to be accorded to States in assessing whether obligations under Article 2(1) had been met.<sup>17</sup> They also proposed to refer to a standard of not being 'unreasonable' to replace the more substantive standard of 'reasonableness'.<sup>18</sup> These proposals were linked to affirmations that States should be free to decide for themselves the 'appropriate policy measures and allocation of its resources in accordance with domestic priorities'.<sup>19</sup> A subsequent draft included bracketed

12 Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Open-Ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Fourth Session, Geneva, UN Doc. A/HRC/6/WG.4/2 (2007) 23 April 2007.

13 Catarina de Albuquerque, 'Chronicle of an Announced Birth: The Coming into Life of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Missing Piece of the International Bill of Human Rights', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No.1 (2010) pp.144-178, at 158.

14 UN Committee on Human Rights, Elements for an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Sixty-second session, 2005), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/WG.23/2 at Part 10 (2005).

15 UN Human Rights Council, Revised Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights (Eighth-session, 2008), U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/WG.4/3 (2008).

16 Working Group, *Report of the fourth session* (n. 8 above), at para. 33.

17 *Ibid.*, at para. 37.

18 UN Committee on Human Rights, *Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its third session* (Third session, 2006), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/47 at para. 92 (2006). China, Japan, India, China, Norway, Poland, and the United Kingdom were among the States who supported the 'unreasonableness' criteria. Working Group, *Report of the fourth session* (n. 8 above), at para. 95.



proposals replacing reasonableness with 'unreasonableness' and directing the Committee to 'take into account the [broad] margin of appreciation of the State Party to determine the optimum use of its resources'.<sup>20</sup> However, delegations which had been more supportive of the Optional Protocol from the beginning generally opposed these proposals.<sup>21</sup>

It was argued by supporters of a comprehensive Optional Protocol that the effect of these proposals would be to incorporate into the text of the Optional Protocol the kind of excessive acquiescence to socio-economic decision-making that has traditionally denied adjudication and remedies for ESC rights claims. It was pointed out by the International NGO Coalition for the OP-ICESCR that a standard of review requiring the Committee to consider whether the steps taken were 'unreasonable' was likely to place an insuperable burden on claimants to establish that decisions or policies were demonstrably unreasonable in their formulation or design.<sup>22</sup> The vision of adjudication focused on compliance and the right to reasonable measures taken to realise rights, commensurate with available resources, which was the energising vision of years of advocacy for the OP-ICESCR, would be lost. With an increasing number of delegations persuaded as to the legitimacy of these concerns, the text was amended in a subsequent draft to remove any reference to unreasonableness, as well as removing the adjective 'broad' from the reference to a 'margin of discretion'.<sup>23</sup>

States and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) participating in the Open-Ended Working Group approached the idea of a standard of review for claims engaging obligations under Article 2(1) from a range of perspectives. The intention of the States sceptical of the Optional Protocol project was generally to limit the scope and application of a complaints procedure in ways that they did not support apply to more traditional spheres of civil and political rights adjudication. Other States argued with some persuasiveness that it was appropriate to provide, within the text of the Optional Protocol, some guidance as to the standard of review that ought to be applied in cases relating to resource allocation and broad socio-economic policy design. Because of the novelty of a complaints process being applied to the unique provisions of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, these delegations argued that States considering ratification, as well as the

19 UN Committee on Human Rights, *Report of the Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its Fifth Session* (Eighth session, 2008), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/7 at 91 (2008).

20 UN Human Rights Committee, *Revised Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights* (Eighth session, 2007), U.N. DocA/HRC/8/WG.4/2 (2007).

21 *Ibid.*, at 114, (Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Portugal, the Russian Federation, and Sri Lanka).

22 Working Group, *Report of the fourth session* (n. 8 above), at paras. 103 and 153.

23 UN Human Rights Committee, *Revised Draft Optional Protocol To The International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights* (n. 15 above), Article 8.

Committee charged with adjudicating complaints, would benefit from some clarification about the standard of review that would be applied. Other delegations were sceptical about the need for any standard of review, since none had been incorporated into any other UN complaints procedure.

A number of questions regarding the standard of review were put to the representative of the CESCR attending the Working Group Sessions. In response to these queries, the CESCR adopted a statement ‘to clarify how it might consider States Parties’ obligations under Article 2(1) in the context of an individual communications procedure’.<sup>24</sup> The CESCR described in its statement a relatively rigorous standard of reasonableness review within which obligations would be assessed in the context of budgetary constraints, but without allowing such constraints to provide justification for inaction, excessive deference to existing policy or legislation, or neglect of the needs of the most disadvantaged and marginalised groups.

The ‘availability of resources’, although an important qualifier to the obligation to take steps, does not alter the immediacy of the obligation, nor can resource constraints alone justify inaction. Where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State Party to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights under the prevailing circumstances. The Committee has already emphasised that, even in times of severe resource constraints, States parties must protect the most disadvantaged and marginalised members or groups of society by adopting relatively low-cost targeted programmes.<sup>25</sup>

In its statement, the CESCR explicitly adopted a reasonableness standard, stating that it would assess the ‘reasonableness’ of steps taken. The Committee listed a number of possible factors it would consider in assessing whether the steps taken had been reasonable. These included:

- (a) the extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete, and targeted towards the fulfilment of economic, social, and cultural rights;
- (b) whether the State Party exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner;
- (c) whether the State Party’s decision (not) to allocate available resources is in accordance with international human rights standards;
- (d) where several policy options are available, whether the State Party adopts the option that least restricts Covenant rights;
- (e) the time frame in which the steps were taken;

24 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the ‘Maximum of available resources’ under an optional protocol to the Covenant* (Thirty-eighth session, 2007), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2007/1 at para. 3 (2007).

25 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the ‘Maximum of available resources’ under an optional protocol to the Covenant* (n. 24 above), at para. 4.

- (f) whether the steps had taken into account the precarious situation of disadvantaged and marginalised individuals or groups, and whether they were non-discriminatory, and whether they prioritised grave situations or situations of risk.<sup>26</sup>

The CESCR also stated that it would place a high priority on ‘transparent and participatory decision-making at the national level’.<sup>27</sup> Interestingly, the Committee linked participatory decision-making to the provision of a margin of appreciation to States allowing them to tailor policies to particular circumstances through engagement with stakeholders:

To this end, and in accordance with the practice of judicial and other quasi-judicial human rights treaty bodies, the Committee always respects the margin of appreciation of States to take steps and adopt measures most suited to their specific circumstances.<sup>28</sup>

As will be described below, the Committee’s approach to reasonableness drew considerably on the approach adopted by the South African Constitutional Court in the *Grootboom* case,<sup>29</sup> with a similar emphasis on the protection of vulnerable groups and compatibility of decision-making with broader human rights values. Reasonableness was also an emerging concept at the international level at this time, with the incorporation of the language of reasonableness into the text of the International Covenant on the Rights of Person with Disabilities (CRPD) where, for the first time in an international treaty, it had been clearly stated that a failure to adopt ‘reasonable’ measures of accommodation constituted, in itself, discrimination in violation of the CRPD.<sup>30</sup>

The Committee’s statement was supported by High Commissioner Arbour, who noted the importance of equality values and non-discrimination in the assessment of reasonableness. The High Commissioner again emphasised the way in which the reasonableness analysis distinguishes the adjudicative role of the Committee from the policy and programme implementation role of States. She noted that

26 Ibid, at para. 8.

27 Ibid, at para. 11.

28 Ibid.

29 *Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v. Grootboom & Others*, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at para. 44.

30 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly (Sixty-first session, 2007), U.N. Doc A/RES/61/106 at Article 2 (2007): ‘Discrimination on the basis of disability means any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation’; ‘Reasonable accommodation’ means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

where the Committee finds that reasonable measures have not been adopted, it will generally be left to the State Party to determine, through its own processes, the precise means to remedy any violation.

As the Committee points out in its statement, the role of an international quasi-judicial review mechanism is not to prescribe policy measures, but rather to assess the reasonableness of such measures in view of the object and purpose of the treaty. For example, a policy that discriminated against women in the provision of essential medicines would clearly not meet such reasonableness criteria. Again, as the Committee points out, a failure to take reasonable measures, if established by the Committee, would give rise to a recommendation that remedial action be taken, while deferring to the discretion of the State Party concerned to decide on the means of doing so.<sup>31</sup>

A consensus began to emerge within the Working Group in favour of the inclusion of a reference to reasonableness along the lines proposed by the High Commissioner, which was supported by the diverse perspectives brought to the table by the States. For some States, the inclusion of a reasonableness standard provided assurances that the Committee would not exceed its competence by ‘micromanaging’ policy choices and resource allocation decisions. For others, a reference to reasonableness in combination with a reference to compliance with Covenant rights was seen as an affirmation that the Committee would engage directly with issues of compliance with Article 2(1) in the context of individual complaints, which would ensure access to justice for victims of violations linked to the failure by States to adopt positive measures and effective strategies. Moreover, the reasonableness standard of review was seen as providing a reassuring link to jurisprudence at the domestic level.

### 2.3 The Rejection of Margin of Discretion Doctrine in Favour of a ‘Range of Possible Policy Measures’

A lurking, unresolved issue in the debates over the reasonableness standard persisted, however, in the form of a proposal to include a reference to ‘margin of discretion’ in Article 8(4), which remained in square brackets throughout.<sup>32</sup> Although this term and the related concept of ‘margin of appreciation’ have been widely applied in European jurisprudence,<sup>33</sup> and has been referred to in other regional systems, the concept has rarely been invoked within the UN treaty body system, and is not found within any

31 Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement by Ms. Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights to the third session of the Open-Ended WG OP-ICESCR (n. 11 above).

32 B. Griffey, ‘The “Reasonableness” Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, *Human Rights Law Review*, Vol.11, No. 2 (2011), pp. 275-327, at 295.

33 M. Forowicz, ‘State Discretion as a Paradox of EU Evolution’ *Max Weber Programme* (Florence: European University Press, 2011), pp.1-33.

UN treaties.<sup>34</sup> It was unclear what the principle would mean in the context of the OP-ICESCR. The CESCR seemed to apply the term in its statement simply to suggest that the Committee would recognise the distinct competence of the State to design and implement programmes and policies with appropriate participation from affected stakeholders; this would be uncontentious. However, references to margins of discretion or appreciation are strongly associated in many jurisdictions with the notion of a reduced standard of scrutiny, a broad deference to States in relation to socio-economic policy, and often to a systemic abdication of any effective adjudicative role for courts or quasi-judicial bodies in relation to substantive ESC rights claims linked to budgetary allocations. Some of the delegates proposing a unique reference to a 'margin of discretion' in the OP-ICESCR seemed to want a signal in favour of differential treatment of this class of rights claims in comparison to others through a categorical deference to States' decisions about socio-economic policy. This could seriously affect access to justice for victims of violations of ESC rights and promote the type of judicial acquiescence to ESC rights violations that the Optional Protocol was intended to correct.<sup>35</sup> The inclusion of the reference to a margin of discretion was likely to be used by domestic courts in some jurisdictions as a basis for dismissing claims engaging with socio-economic policy choices.

After eloquent submissions from a number of States during the final days of the drafting about these dangers of incorporating a reference to a 'margin of discretion', led by Portugal and Finland and strongly supported by the NGO Coalition for the OP-ICESCR, the Chairperson removed from the draft any reference to 'margin of discretion' or 'margin of appreciation'. The session on the second last day, however, began with a

- 34 In *Leo Hertzberg et al v. Finland*, Communication No. 61/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 124 (1985), the UN Human Rights Committee, somewhat unfortunately, accepted that national authorities can be granted 'a certain margin of discretion' in relation to public morality standards applied to homosexuality, given the lack of universally applicable standards. The principle has not, however, been applied in any universal or consistent way by the Committee. See for example *Monica Bryhn (represented by Mr. John Ch. Elden) v. Norway*, Communication No. 789/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/789/1997 (2 November 1999) at 4.4 where the State Party argues for the acceptance of a margin for the implementation of the right, but the Committee does not apply the principle in its decision in favour of the State Party. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has invoked a 'margin of discretion,' or a 'considerable margin of discretion' in general comments from General Comment 12 (1999) onwards, with the exception of General Comment 13 on the Right to Education and General Comment 20 on Non-Discrimination. The Committee also refers to the margin of discretion in its Statement on concepts more frequently in the context of General Comments. See, for example, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 16* (n. 62 above) at para 32. It is hoped that the Committee in light of the text of the Optional Protocol and its drafting history the Committee will refrain from invoking the concept of margin of discretion in its views on communications submitted under the Optional Protocol.
- 35 UN Committee on Human Rights, *Report of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its third session* (n. 18 above), at paras. 92, 95, 130; Working Group, *Report of the third session* (n. 8 above), at para. 93.

demonstration of very effective lobbying by Canada, backed by the US and a number of other States, insisting that a reference to a 'margin of discretion' or 'margin of appreciation' must be reinserted if they were to support the referral of the draft to the Human Rights Council.<sup>36</sup> It was clear that some kind of alternative language would be necessary to save the Protocol.

It was critical at this juncture to distinguish between the two understandings of the margin of discretion at play. Those most concerned about the concept feared that it would be interpreted as meaning that the Committee should exercise deference to what the State considered reasonable, thus abdicating an important component of the assessment of compliance with the Covenant to the State under review. Another interpretation suggested that the reference to a margin of discretion simply meant that the Committee should recognise that where there are a number of options available to the State to achieve compliance, it is up to the State to make the choice of means and not for the Committee to choose what it considers the best policies and programmes. What was required, therefore, was wording that confirmed the second interpretation, without suggesting that the Committee would abdicate its mandated role of assessing compliance with the Covenant by simply deferring to the State's decisions regarding what is 'reasonable'.

Lillian Chenwi, a member of the NGO coalition, accessed the *Grootboom* decision on her laptop and referred delegates informally to the wording of paragraph 41 of the decision:

The question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the State to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of reasonableness.<sup>37</sup>

The reference to a range of possible measures from which the State can choose did not suggest deference to the State in the assessment of reasonableness itself. Rather, the Constitutional Court of South Africa had simply recognised the role of the State in exercising policy choices and in crafting the precise contours of programmes and policies. The Chairperson inserted similar wording into a revised text and presented it to the delegates, affirming that in considering the reasonableness of the steps taken, 'the Committee shall bear in mind that the State Party may adopt a

36 Working Group, *Report of the fifth session*, 23 May 2008, A/HRC/8/7 at para 168. See drafting proposals by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Open-ended Working Group, fifth session, 25 March 2008, A/HRC/8/WG.4/3 at para 173. This amendment mirrored proposals put forward earlier in the session by Canada and New Zealand, to interpret 'reasonableness' to be 'consistent', in 'compliance' or in 'accordance' with Part II of the Covenant: see Draft 4 of Article 8(4), fifth session, 25 March 2008, A/HRC/8/WG.4/3 at paras 90 and 168, online: [http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/escr/documents\\_5.htm](http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/escr/documents_5.htm).

37 *Grootboom* (n. 33 above), at para 41.

range of possible policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant'. The Chairperson explained that the intention behind the new wording was to acknowledge that there could be different policies that are compliant with Covenant obligations, and that it would therefore be left to States, and not to the Committee, to make those policy choices.<sup>38</sup> Enough States were satisfied with this proposal that the Chairperson was able to announce on 4 April 2008 that there were no objections to the transmission of the draft<sup>39</sup> for consideration by the Human Rights Council. The text was subsequently adopted without any changes to Article 8(4), and, thus, the reference to margin of appreciation was not included in the final version.

### 3 Reasonableness Review: The Demarcation of Roles

What are we to deduce from the fact that reference to a 'margin of discretion' was removed from Article 8(4) and replaced with an acknowledgment that the State may adopt a range of policies to implement the rights in the Covenant? The most important point to acknowledge is that the final wording of 8(4) certainly addresses the concerns of many States about a blurring of roles of adjudication and governance. Article 8(4) recognises a clear distinction between the adjudicative role of the Committee and the policy-making role of States, just as High Commissioner Arbour proposed in her opening remarks to the Open-Ended Working Group. As the High Commissioner described it, a reasonableness standard clearly assigns to the courts the role of adjudicating rights claims and reviewing policies and programmes alleged to have violated rights, in order to determine if the State has acted reasonably in the context of available resources and other constraints. That role is not to be confused with the role of governments with respect to designing and implementing policies and programmes. Deference to States' legitimate policy choices does not entail deference to what the State argues is reasonable in relation to compliance with rights under the Covenant. That would be an abdication of the adjudicative role reserved to the Committee.

38 C. de Albuquerque, 'Chronicle of an Announced Birth: The Coming into Life of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – The Missing Piece of the International Bill of Human Rights', (n. 13 above) at 175 (mostly European Union member States, African, and Latin American States).

39 Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Revised Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Letter from the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Catarina de Albuquerque, to the Members of the Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Fifth session, 2008), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/WG.4/3 (2008).

As suggested by the High Commissioner, assessing reasonableness under the OP-ICESCR must be understood in the context of adjudicating rights claims. It does not require the CESCR to take on the role of an expert body in social policy or to review States' socio-economic policies and programmes to assess whether they are reasonable from the standpoint of sound economic or social policy. The assessment of reasonableness in which the CESCR must engage is an issue of human rights adjudication, not social policy assessment. As High Commissioner Arbour had described it, it is a contextual interpretation and application of human rights in particular circumstances. Rights claims and the lived-realities of rights claimants are as much a part of the context in which reasonableness must be assessed as are the policy-making and budgetary realities that the State will bring to light. The dignity issues at stake are brought to life by rights claimants; these must be central to the Committee's assessment of reasonableness. Contextual dignity issues may include, for example, the consideration of culturally appropriate housing and access to traditional lifestyles in cases of the indigenous right to housing, or the unique circumstances of people with disabilities in relation to the right to sanitation. Each case will have unique considerations that can only be properly understood by fully hearing the voice of the claimants. States, for their part, bear the responsibility of providing to the Committee information about the broader context in which policies have been adopted, and decisions have been made. They must ensure that evidence of competing needs, of limitations on capacity, or of policy concerns that are not part of the experience of the rights claimants are placed before the Committee in the form of objective and reliable evidence. In many cases, the Committee will also want to benefit from the expertise and perspectives of other parties, which are permitted, under the unique wording of Article 8(1) of the OP-ICESCR, to provide information and documentation independently of either of the parties.

Under the OP-ICESCR it is the role of the Committee to assess, in light of all of the evidence before it, the reasonableness of the steps taken. Where there is a range of policies or programmes through which Covenant rights may be implemented, consistent with the requirements of the Covenant, and properly informed by the dignity interests and experiences of rights claimants, Article 8(4) establishes that it is not the Committee's role to decide which policies should be adopted. Rather, the Committee will recommend a course of action necessary for the State to remedy a violation of rights. In most cases, this will at a minimum require immediate action by the State Party to enact an effective and coherent strategy, as well as a longer term plan for ongoing dialogue involving Governments, rights-claimants, and other affected groups, for the purpose of putting in place monitoring and accountability mechanisms. In many instances, there may be no 'range of policy options' in relation to immediate obligations. An eviction may be required to be halted, a discriminatory policy may have to be rescinded, or immediate needs for housing or food may be required to be provided. These immediate remedies will in most cases be combined



with longer term strategic remedies consistent with what the CESCR has described as necessary for reasonable policies and strategies and to realise rights.<sup>40</sup>

It is only in this sense of demarcating the Committee's adjudicative role from the State's implementational role that Article 8(4) directs the Committee to defer to the State's expertise and democratic legitimacy to choose from policy options, implement programmes, and adopt legislative measures. The assessment of what constitutes reasonable steps to comply with Covenant rights remains the mandated role of the Committee as the adjudicative body, and the Committee should not abdicate its adjudicative role to the State. Former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Ian Binnie made a similar point in relation to domestic separation of powers in assessing 'reasonable limits' under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms<sup>41</sup> in a case involving a violation of rights by budgetary restraint measures. Responding to a proposal from the court below that courts should generally defer to legislatures' assessment of what constitute reasonable budgetary measures rather than engaging in its own assessment, Justice Binnie responded:

No doubt Parliament and the legislatures, generally speaking, *do* enact measures that they, representing the majority view, consider to be reasonable limits that have been demonstrated to *their* satisfaction as justifiable. Deference to the legislative choice to the degree proposed by Marshall JA would largely circumscribe and render superfluous the independent second look imposed on the courts by s. 1 of the Charter.<sup>42</sup>

The same principle of separating the adjudicative and policy-making roles applies to the consideration of reasonableness as mandated by Article 8(4). Article 8(4) recognises that the Committee ought not to assume the role of designing and implementing policy, which is the proper function of the State; nor, however, should the State be accorded the role of determining what constitutes compliance with the Covenant on the basis of a reasonableness standard which is the proper function of the Committee. The State Party has the opportunity to advocate before the Committee for its view of what constitutes reasonable policy and budgetary allocations, and the claimant has the opportunity to respond with an alternative view. It is the Committee's role to adjudicate the question with independence and neutrality, allotting no more deference to one side than to the other.

40 See discussion of CESCR jurisprudence below.

41 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 section 1: 'The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.'

42 *Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE*, [2004] 3 SCR 381, at para 103.

The reasonableness standard affirmed in Article 8(4) should also be clearly distinguished from a variety of standards of deference applied in judicial review of other adjudicative bodies by domestic courts. Reasonableness in this context may embody the principle that courts ought to defer to the unique competence of administrative decision-makers or of lower courts when those adjudicators or judicial bodies are better situated to make findings of fact or to apply law in their field of expertise. There are also various deferential standards of rationality review according to which decisions of specialised bodies will not be interfered with unless there have been serious errors compromising procedural fairness or rendering decisions patently unreasonable. These principles of deference to lower courts or tribunal do not generally apply under the OP-ICESCR because the Committee is not reviewing decisions of other adjudicative bodies.<sup>43</sup> In adjudicating complaints of violations of the ICESCR, the Committee may defer to the competence of domestic courts when they have made findings of fact that are relevant to a complaint, as other treaty bodies have done.<sup>44</sup> The Committee will certainly rely on the domestic policy expertise available to the State and to domestic agencies, just as it will rely on the evidence adduced by rights claimants, their experts, or intervening groups about the effect of programmes or policies on their dignity interests. A competent assessment of reasonableness will rely heavily on expert evidence and opinion presented both by the author of the petition and by the State Party as well as by third parties. Recognising the distinctive expertise of domestic experts in relation to the subject matter of the complaint, however, is quite different from exercising deference to either party in relation to the determination of whether the State has acted reasonably to realise the rights in question. Confusion about deference and competency issues largely stems from a confusion of the adjudicative role from the policy design and implementation role. If the CDESCR is misconceived as a kind of expert body in social and economic policy, then the problem of its competence to sit in judgment of the decisions of domestic policy experts and governments becomes problematic. If, however, the CDESCR is properly conceived of as a body that adjudicates rights claims in light of the best evidence available on both the effect of challenged policies or failures to act, and the justification for these effects

43 Reasonableness as a standard of deference to other administrative bodies should be distinguished from emerging standards of reasonableness in administrative law that require decision-makers to ensure that their decisions are consistent with fundamental human rights. As Liebenberg and Quinot have pointed out, this more substantive conception of reasonableness in administrative law can be applied so as to be compatible with standards of reasonableness applied in ESC rights adjudication (Geo Quinot & Sandra Liebenberg, 'Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa' (2011) 22 *Stellenbosch Law Review* 639-663. In this sense, a reasonableness standard of review of administrative decision-makers would be similar to standards applied by the CDESCR in considering whether decisions made by domestic administrative bodies are in accordance with the ICESCR.

44 UN Human Rights Committee, *Zwaan de Vries v. Netherlands* Communication No. 182/1984, U.N. Doc Supp. No. 40 A/42/40 (1987).

and failures, against the human rights standards of the Covenant, then there is no longer a conceptual problem. The Committee must assess the evidence, including opinion evidence provided by the State Party as to why particular measures were, or were not adopted. The Committee must determine what weight to accord evidence and adjudicate independently and fairly whether a right has been infringed or whether, on the contrary, the State has complied with the Covenant in the circumstances. The adjudicative role now accorded to the Committee must not be abdicated to either of the parties, including in the determination of what is reasonable in accordance with Covenant rights and available resources.

#### **4 Reasonableness as Substantive Compliance with ESC Rights**

The fact that the wording of the reasonableness standard incorporated into the OP-ICESCR was adapted from a paragraph of the *Grootboom* decision of the South African Constitutional Court is of some value in interpreting how it should be applied. While the Committee is in no way bound to follow the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court on reasonableness, it should certainly recognise that the standard of reasonableness around which consensus was reached was heavily influenced by the *Grootboom* ruling. Indeed, it is helpful to distinguish the *Grootboom* decision, which was a key reference point for the drafters, from subsequent jurisprudence of that Court, which was not. There are a number of critical aspects of the approach to reasonableness affirmed by the Court in *Grootboom* that resonate with the Committee's own jurisprudence, and are key to its proper application in the context of the OP-ICESCR. CESCR jurisprudence on reasonableness will be informed by developments in many jurisdictions, but it is helpful to consider some of the foundational principles affirmed in *Grootboom* that made that decision one upon which a consensus position could be framed.

In *Grootboom*, the Court recognised that reasonableness should not be understood solely, or even primarily, as a limit or constraint on socio-economic rights, but rather as a guarantee of rights – a measure of compliance with the obligation of progressive realisation, framed by constitutional values and assessed in the context of the dignity interests and the fundamental rights of claimants.<sup>45</sup> The Court affirmed dignity in rights as the foundation of reasonableness review so as to make reasonableness as much about the content of rights in particular circumstances, as about justifying failures to realise them. Resource constraints or limits on institutional capacity may justify certain limits to the immediate enjoyment of socio-economic rights, but available budgets and institutional capacity also create obligations on the State to utilise this

45 *Grootboom* (n. 32 above), at paras. 41-4 and 83. Section 26.

capacity reasonably in accordance with the priority that must be accorded to human rights.

It is fundamental to an evaluation of the reasonableness of State action that account be taken of the inherent dignity of human beings ... Section 26, read in the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole, must mean that the respondents have a right to reasonable action by the State in all circumstances and with particular regard to human dignity. In short, I emphasise that human beings are required to be treated as human beings.<sup>46</sup>

Although some subsequent decisions of the Constitutional Court of South Africa have raised concerns that the Court has focused the assessment of reasonableness too squarely on the rationale provided by governments,<sup>47</sup> the *Grootboom* decision from which the Optional Protocol text draws its inspiration presents a substantive conception of reasonableness based on the obligation to realise socio-economic rights consistently with the foundational value of human dignity.<sup>48</sup> The paragraph from which the wording of the Article 8(4) is taken affirms that reasonable policies 'must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right'.<sup>49</sup> The reasonableness standard affirmed in *Grootboom* thus emphasises the transformative dimension of socio-economic rights, affirming that the commitment to 'transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order'.<sup>50</sup>

The standard of reasonableness affirmed in the *Grootboom* decision represents a rejection of the deferential standard proposed by States advocating for a reference to a 'wide margin of discretion' in the OP-ICESCR. As Sandra Liebenberg has noted:

While *Soobramoney* raised the spectre of the Court adopting a thin standard of rationality scrutiny for socio-economic rights claims, the Court in *Grootboom* and *TAC* proceeded to develop a more substantive set of criteria for assessing the reasonableness of the State's acts or omissions.<sup>51</sup>

Critical to the reasonableness standard affirmed in *Grootboom* is the requirement that reasonable policies do not ignore the needs of those who are marginalised, or in desperate circumstances. Just as the CESCR emphasised in its statement to the Open-Ended Working Group that

46 Ibid, at para. 83.

47 S. Wilson and J. Dugard, 'Taking Poverty Seriously: The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-Economic Rights', *Stellenbosch Law Review*, Vol. 3 (2011), pp.664-682, at 679.

48 On the importance of the dignity interest in reasonableness review see S. Liebenberg, 'The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights', *South African Journal on Human Rights*, Vol. 21 (2005), pp. 1-31.

49 Ibid, at para. 41.

50 Ibid, at para. 25; See S Liebenberg, 'Towards a transformative adjudication of socio-economic rights', *Speculum Juris*, Vol. 21 (2007), pp. 41-59.

51 Sandra Liebenberg, *Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution* (Juta & Co: Claremont, 2010), p. 152.

reasonable policies must prioritise those who are marginalised and at greatest risk, so too did the Constitutional Court affirm that '[t]hose whose needs are most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights is therefore most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right'.<sup>52</sup> The Court also affirmed in *Grootboom* that a reasonable policy must be consistent with the obligation to progressively realise socio-economic rights, ensuring that barriers to the realisation of the right are eliminated over time and avoiding what the CESCR has called 'deliberately retrogressive measures'.<sup>53</sup>

Liebenberg lists the following additional features identified by the Constitutional Court as characterising a reasonable policy capable of facilitating the realisation of socio-economic rights, many of which were taken up by the CESCR in its statement to the Open-Ended Working Group:

- It must be comprehensive, coherent and coordinated.
- Appropriate financial and human resources must be made available for the programme.
- It must be balanced and flexible and make appropriate provision for short, medium and long-term needs.
- It must be reasonably conceived and implemented.
- It must be transparent, and its contents must be made known effectively to the public.<sup>54</sup>

While the Court in *Grootboom* refers to the characteristics of a housing policy in the singular, it recognised that all socio-economic rights are interrelated, such that it is impossible to isolate housing policy from policies and programmes implementing the right to social security, food, or an adequate income: 'Socio-economic rights must all be read together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole.'<sup>55</sup> Article 8(4) refers to the Committee's role in assessing the reasonableness of the 'steps taken', in the plural. It is often difficult, and indeed counter-productive to tie violations of ESC rights to a singular policy or provision. Socio-economic rights violations are usually the result of complex interactions of different programmes and administrative decisions, acts, and omissions by public actors, and are generally affected by a range of structural factors as well as multiple roles of private actors. Article 8(4) appropriately mandates the Committee to assess whether reasonable steps have been taken, without requiring it to pinpoint a particular policy or measure required or to consider only if a particular provision is reasonable.

52 *Grootboom* (n. 32 above), at para. 44.

53 *Ibid*, at para. 45.

54 Sandra Liebenberg, *Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution* (Juta & Co: Claremont, 2010), p. 309.

55 *Grootboom* (n. 32 above), at para. 24.

As explained in the chapter on remedies in this Commentary, the Committee may often elect to recommend that the State Party, in dialogue with various stakeholders, review the range of policy options available and implement a plan that combines both immediate steps and longer term strategies that engage with multiple policies and programmes. In cases that involve a range of options available to the State Party, it may not be necessary or appropriate for the Committee to make specific recommendations about discrete provisions, budgetary allocations, or programme design. In some cases, of course, there may be only one reasonable way to remedy a violation, in which case specific recommendations would be entirely appropriate. The over-riding principle that will guide the Committee's choices of remedy will be the purposes of the ICESCR and of the OP-ICESCR. Remedial recommendations must be effective in ensuring the realisation of the rights in question, for those who claim them and for others affected.

In the *Grootboom* case, the Court situated the claim in the context of the dignity interests of the claimants, the transformative aspirations of the new South African Constitution, and the need to address the continuation of dramatic socio-economic inequality as a legacy of apartheid. When placed in this context, the task of assessing whether the failure to address the needs of Irene Grootboom and her community did not strain the competence of the Constitutional Court. Addressing the complex interaction of various policies and programmes in order to remedy the violation was assessed by the Court in that case to be the proper role of the governmental respondents, with meaningful participation by stakeholders. Rather than undermining the policy-making role of Governments, the adjudicative process enhanced democratic accountability, providing a greater understanding of dignity interests within a cultural and historical context, and ensuring that the experience and 'voice' of claimants was heard. It will be important for the CESCR to similarly demonstrate that the adjudication of rights ensures enhanced transparency, and reinforces democratic and participatory decision-making.

In line with the substantive approach to reasonableness affirmed by the Constitutional Court in *Grootboom*, Article 8(4) affirms a distinctive standard for assessing compliance with positive obligations under the ICESCR in the context of individual communications. Reasonableness of steps taken is assessed 'in accordance with the content of the rights in Part II of the Covenant' and the policy measures that the Committee is mandated to assess are those which are required 'for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant'. Article 8(4) thus articulates a standard of compliance with the Covenant that considers not simply the State's justification of its policies based on competing needs or limits on resources but, more fundamentally, whether the steps taken by the State would allow the realisation of the rights at stake in the particular socio-economic and historical context in a manner that provides full participatory rights and recognises the dignity and rights of those whose

claims are at issue. Reasonableness is a contextual inquiry into the content of Covenant rights in particular circumstances, attending equally to both the voice and experiences of claimants, and to the realities, restraints, and difficult choices faced by Governments. What is reasonable will depend as much on the nature of the interest at stake and the unique circumstances of the particular claimant or group, as on budgetary constraints, competing needs and policy rationale presented by the State.

## 5 Jurisprudence of the CESCR on Reasonableness

Beyond the CESCR's 2007 statement on the reasonableness standard under the Optional Protocol, there is extensive jurisprudence in the Committee's General Comments and in its Concluding Observations on Periodic Reviews of State Parties that provides clarification as to the requirements of policies and strategies for compliance with Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. While the approach to reasonableness and the review of policies for compliance with the Covenant will be different in the context of period reviews and General Comments than when it is situated in the context of particular rights claims, the Committee's views on what constitutes reasonable policies will certainly inform its approach to reasonableness in the context of the OP-ICESCR.

In the CESCR's view, all reasonable strategies must be informed by an equality framework that prioritises the needs of disadvantaged groups, and ensures protection from discrimination.<sup>56</sup> States have an immediate and unqualified duty to ensure both formal and substantive equality in the implementation of policies.<sup>57</sup> Strategies must specifically address issues of systemic discrimination and the barriers faced by individuals who have suffered historic discrimination, or who presently suffer from prejudice.<sup>58</sup> There must be 'adequate legislative protection from discrimination either by State or non-State actors'.<sup>59</sup> Reasonable policies are not simply policies that allocate an appropriate level of resources to programmes. They should also address the structural and systemic causes of poverty and social

56 UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights, *General Comment 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (art 2 para 2) (42nd session, 2009), U.N. Doc E/C.12/GC/20 at para. 9 (2009). See also UN Committee on Human Rights, *Note verbale* dated 86/12/05 from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Centre for Human Rights ('Limburg Principles') (43rd session, 1987), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1987/17 at para. 39 (1987): 'Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure to such groups or individuals equal enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights shall not be deemed discrimination.'

57 M. Ssenyonjo, 'Reflections on State Obligations with Respect to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Human Rights Law', *International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 6 (2011), pp. 969-1012.

58 UNCESCR, *General Comment 20* (n. 56 above), at para. 8.

59 Ssenyonjo, 'Reflections on State Obligations with Respect to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Human Rights Law' (n. 57 above), p. 976.

exclusion, and should include 'efforts to overcome negative stereotyped images'.<sup>60</sup> Additionally, policies should rely on effective 'coordination between the national ministries, regional and local authorities'.<sup>61</sup> Among other agencies, human rights institutions should play an important role in overseeing implementation strategies by scrutinising existing laws, identifying appropriate goals and benchmarks, providing research, monitoring compliance, examining complaints of alleged infringements or disseminating educational materials.<sup>62</sup>

Strategies for the realisation of rights should, themselves, be based on rights, and should provide for effective judicial or administrative remedies. A rights framework is both the means and the ends of reasonable policies, programmes and strategies. As stated in the CESCR's General Comment No. 9, administrative remedies must be accessible, affordable, timely and effective.<sup>63</sup> Meaningful participation informed by the rights of affected constituencies is a critical procedural component of reasonable policies and programmes. As stated in General Comment No. 4, 'both for reasons of relevance and effectiveness, as well as in order to ensure respect for other human rights, [a housing] strategy should reflect extensive genuine consultation with, and participation by, all of those affected'.<sup>64</sup> Strategies for realising ESC rights should operate according to principles of accountability which the Committee has identified as including transparency, participation, decentralisation, legislative capacity, judicial independence, institutional responsibility for process, monitoring procedures, and redress procedures.<sup>65</sup> Both long and short-term timelines should be adopted, with particular attention paid to interim steps such as 'temporary special measures [that] may sometimes be needed in order to bring disadvantaged or marginalised persons or groups of persons to the same substantive level as others'.<sup>66</sup>

The CESCR has emphasised that reasonable programmes and policies should also include independent monitoring and assessment of budgetary

60 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 6: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons* (13<sup>th</sup> session, 1996), U.N. Doc E/1996/22 at para. 41 (1996).

61 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 15: The right to water* (Twenty-ninth session, 2002), U.N. Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (2002).

62 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 10: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (19<sup>th</sup> session, 1998), U.N. Doc E/C.12/1998/25 at para. 3 (1998).

63 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 9: The domestic application of the Covenant* (19<sup>th</sup> session, 1998), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 at para. 9 (1998).

64 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 4: The right to adequate housing* (6<sup>th</sup> session, 1991), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at 114, para. 12 (1991).

65 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 12: Right to adequate food* (20<sup>th</sup> session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 at paras. 23, 29 (1999).

66 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (art 3) (34<sup>th</sup> session, 2005), U.N. Doc E/C.12/2005/4 at para. 15 (2005).



measures. Effective participatory rights and monitoring depend on the transparent allocation and expenditure of resources.<sup>67</sup> The reasonableness of budgetary allotment can be assessed based on information about the percentage of the budget allocated to specific rights under the ICESCR in comparison to areas of spending that are not related to fulfilling human rights. The State Party's resource allocation may also be compared to that of other States with similar levels of development.<sup>68</sup> Substantive elements required of a reasonable policy have been characterised by the 'Four A's':

- availability (access to relevant services);
- accessibility (physical and economic accessibility and non-discriminatory access);
- acceptability (based on qualitative standards);
- adaptability (flexible and geared to meeting of particular cultural and other needs, as well as responsive to changes in circumstances).<sup>69</sup>

From its earliest General Comment adopted in 1989 to clarify States' reporting requirements, the CESCR has emphasised that resource and other constraints do not relieve Governments from immediate obligations to put in place strategic policies to facilitate the realisation of Covenant rights over time.<sup>70</sup> In its first General Comment the Committee emphasised the overriding obligation to develop 'clearly stated and carefully targeted policies, including the establishment of priorities which reflect the provisions of the Covenant'.<sup>71</sup> There is also a specific obligation 'to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation' of each of the rights contained in the Covenant.<sup>72</sup> This is

67 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 3: The nature of States parties' obligations* (5<sup>th</sup> session, 1990), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86, para. 11 (1990).

68 Ssenyonjo, 'Reflections on State Obligations with Respect to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Human Rights Law' (n. 57 above), at 980-81. See, e.g., UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Democratic Republic of Congo* (43<sup>rd</sup> session, 2009), U.N. Doc E/C.12/COD/CO/4 at para.16 (2009), where the Committee found that the State's decreased allocation of resources to social sector development, combined with increased levels of military spending, resulted in a violation of its Covenant obligations; Griffey, 'The 'Reasonableness' Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (n. 32 above) at 290.

69 Components of the 'four A's' vary with each specific right. See e.g., UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 13: The Role of Education (art 13)* (21<sup>st</sup> session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 at para. 6 (1999); UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health* (22<sup>nd</sup> session, 2000), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 at para.12 (2000); UNCESCR, *General Comment 15* (n. 61 above) at para. 11.

70 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 1: Report by States Parties* (Third session, 1989), U.N. Doc E/1989/22 (1989).

71 Ibid, at para. 4.

72 Ibid.

clearly implied, according to the CESCR, by the obligation in Article 2(1) 'to take steps ... by all appropriate means'.<sup>73</sup>

The reasonableness standard in Article 8(4) will require compliance with the obligation to develop clear strategies and plans, and to monitor progress toward identified goals at the same time as meeting immediate obligations commensurate with the available resources and other historical/contextual challenges. The CESCR explained in General Comment No. 3, On the nature of States parties obligations (Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Covenant),<sup>74</sup> that while Covenant rights are subject to progressive realisation, there are three overriding obligations which are of immediate effect: the obligation to ensure non-discrimination; the obligation 'to take steps'; and the obligation to ensure access to effective remedies. The reasonableness standard will incorporate all three of these immediate obligations. The steps taken, according to General Comment No. 3, 'should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognised in the Covenant'.<sup>75</sup> 'Moreover, the obligations to monitor the extent of the realisation, or more especially of the non-realization, of ESC rights, and to devise strategies and programmes for their promotion, are not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints.'<sup>76</sup> Legislative measures are almost always desirable and in some cases indispensable. The CESCR notes that it will be particularly interested in whether legislative measures 'create any right of action on behalf of individuals or groups who feel that their rights are not being fully realized'.<sup>77</sup> In General Comments relating to the right to adequate food,<sup>78</sup> the right to social security,<sup>79</sup> the right to work,<sup>80</sup> the right to health<sup>81</sup> and the right to water,<sup>82</sup> the CESCR calls on States to create targeted national strategies based on human rights principles to ensure the realisation of Covenant rights. In General Comment No. 18 on the right to work, the CESCR calls for State Governments to adopt an 'employment strategy targeting disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups', which includes 'indicators and benchmarks by which progress in

73 UN General Assembly, *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (16 December 1966) UN Treaty Series, Vol. 993, p. 3 at Article 2(1) *entry into force* January 3, 1976.

74 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations* (Article 2, para. 1 of the Covenant) (5<sup>th</sup> session, 1990), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1990).

75 *Ibid.*, at para. 2.

76 *Ibid.*, at para. 11.

77 *Ibid.*, at para. 6.

78 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food* (art 11) (20<sup>th</sup> session, 1999), U.N. Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (1999).

79 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 19: The Right to Social Security* (Article 9) (39<sup>th</sup> session, 2007), U.N. Doc E/C.12/GC/19 (2008).

80 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *General Comment 18: Article 6: The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights* (35<sup>th</sup> session, 2006), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (2006).

81 UNCESCR, *General Comment 14* (n. 69 above).

82 UNCESCR, *General Comment 15* (n. 61 above).

relation to the right to work can be measured and periodically reviewed'.<sup>83</sup> In General Comment No. 12 on the right to food, the CESCR 'affirms that the right to adequate food is indivisibly linked to the inherent dignity of the human person' and requires States to adopt 'appropriate economic, environmental and social policies ... oriented to the eradication of poverty and the fulfilment of all human rights', as well as 'a national strategy to ensure food and nutrition security for all'.<sup>84</sup> In General Comment No. 14 on the right to health, the CESCR outlines State Parties' core obligation to adopt and implement national health strategies and plans of action based on a 'participatory and transparent process'.<sup>85</sup> National health strategies must include measures of prevention and 'right to health indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored'.<sup>86</sup> Strategies and plans of action must also pay 'particular attention to all vulnerable or marginalised groups' and address the social determinants of health.<sup>87</sup> Similar obligations are enumerated with respect to the development of 'comprehensive and integrated strategies and programmes' to implement the right to water.<sup>88</sup>

In its first decision under the Optional Protocol, *I.D.G. v. Spain*,<sup>89</sup> the Committee emphasised that ensuring access to effective remedies for Covenant rights is an obligation of immediate effect. Drawing on General Comments 3 and 9 in particular, the Committee stated that the requirement in Article 2(1) that States realise Covenant rights 'by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures' includes an immediate obligation to adopt legislative measures to ensure access to effective judicial remedies, 'since, as the Committee noted in its General Comment No. 9, there cannot be a right without a remedy to protect it'.<sup>90</sup>

It is clear from the Committee's jurisprudence in these diverse areas that even in the context of resource constraints and other limitations on capacity, the reasonableness review mandated by Article 8(4) will require States to develop targeted and coherent strategies which are, in the words of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 'capable of facilitating the realisation of the right'.<sup>91</sup> As Brian Griffey notes, 'questions remain as to how the "reasonableness" test will be applied, but the answer must be

83 Ibid, para 31.

84 UNCESCR, *General Comment 12* (n. 78 above), at paras. 4 and 21.

85 UNCESCR, *General Comment 14* (n. 69 above), at para. 43(f).

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 UNCESCR, *General Comment 15* (n. 61 above), at para. 28.

89 *I.D.G. v. Spain*, Communication No. 2/2014. Views adopted by the Committee at its 55th session (1-19 June 2015), para 11.3.

90 Ibid.

91 *Grootboom* (n. 32 above), at para. 41.

consistent with ICESCR obligations and the object and purpose of the Optional Protocol'.<sup>92</sup> The transformative and purposive dimensions of the reasonableness standard in 8(4) must provide the over-riding interpretive framework for its application in particular contexts. The Committee's critical role will be to assess whether decisions and policies that may have seemed reasonable to governments when particular rights or interests were overlooked, are reasonable in relation to the primary goal of realising Covenant rights by all appropriate and reasonable means, with priority accorded to those whose circumstances render their rights most vulnerable to being ignored or neglected.

## 6 Converging and Overlapping Standards of Reasonableness

While the standard of reasonableness under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR should be developed as a distinctive standard consistent with the purposes of the ICESCR, there will also be inevitable cross-referencing and cross-pollination among treaty bodies, particularly when they are adjudicating similar issues. When the CDESCR is adjudicating complaints of discrimination in relation to access to social benefits, it may wish to bring its approach to reasonableness as a justification for discrimination in line with approaches developed by the UN Human Rights Committee, regional bodies such as the Inter-American Commission and Court, and domestic courts and tribunals that have developed important jurisprudence on substantive equality. Where it is addressing the failures of States to adopt reasonable measures to address the needs of persons with disabilities, the CDESCR will want to cross-reference the reasonableness standard under the OP-ICESCR with that being applied to ensure reasonable accommodation of disabilities under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (OP-CRPD).

The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) has affirmed a number of principles of reasonableness that may be helpful to the CDESCR in developing its own jurisprudence. The HRC has affirmed that the assessment of reasonableness must be both purposive and contextual, and that a policy must be consistent with the purpose of the Covenant read as a whole.<sup>93</sup> These principles have been incorporated in domestic jurisprudence into the approach to reasonableness in the sphere of socio-economic rights and should also be useful under the OP-ICESCR. In other cases, the Human Rights Committee has considered, in the context of assessing reasonableness the importance of promoting equality for women

92 B. Griffey, 'The "Reasonableness" Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (n. 32 above), at 304.

93 United Nations Human Rights Committee, *Sandra Lovelace v. Canada*, Communication No. R.6/24, (36th session, 1981), U.N. Doc Supp. No. 40 A/36/40 (1981).

and other groups; whether policies have ensured access to basic requirements of subsistence for disadvantaged groups; whether they are consistent with provisions of other international treaties and ILO conventions; and how policies compare with common practice in other countries.<sup>94</sup>

The Committee on the Rights of the Child has similarly affirmed that a strategy to implement children's rights must go beyond a list of good intentions or vague commitments: It must set specific, attainable goals with implementation measures, timelines, and provisions for necessary resource allocation.<sup>95</sup> These norms are in line with those that have been put forward by the CESCR.

Emerging jurisprudence from the OP-CRPD will be of particular importance in determining future directions of reasonableness review, and will be of considerable benefit to the CESCR. The CRPD affirms a right to reasonable measures to accommodate disability, as well as the obligation of States to progressively realise ESC rights. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will thus be applying the reasonableness

- 94 United Nations Human Rights Committee, *John K. Love, William L. Bone, William J. Craig, and Peter B. Ivanoff (represented by counsel, Kathryn Fawcett) v. Australia*, Communication No. 983/2001 (77<sup>th</sup> session, 2003), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/77/D/983/2001 at paras. 18.2-18.3 (2003). The Committee found that while the International Labour Organisation had built up an elaborate regime of protection against discrimination in employment, mandatory retirement age for airline pilots did not appear to be prohibited in any of their Conventions. It was found that widespread national and international practice was taken into account, and the aim of maximising safety to passengers, crew, and persons otherwise affected by flight travel was a legitimate aim under the International Labour Organisation Covenants; United Nations Human Rights Committee, *Guido Jacobs v. Belgium*, Communication No. 943/2000 (81<sup>st</sup> session, 2004), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/81/D/943/2000 at para. 9.5 (2004). The Committee found that an introduction of a gender requirement in the judicial code was proportionally reasonable when considering the purpose of the requirement to promote equality between men and women in consultative bodies, the means applied, and its modalities; and one of the aims of the law, which is to establish a High Council made up of qualified individuals; United Nations Human Rights Committee, *Hendrika S. Vos (represented by M.E. Diepstraten) v. The Netherlands*, Communication No. 218/1986 (34<sup>th</sup> session, 1989), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/35/D/218/1986 at para 12 (1989). The Committee found that the applicant was not discriminated against under the General Disablement Benefits Act when applying a uniform rule that there should be avoidance of overlapping benefits (as she was covered under the General Disablement Benefits Act). This was decided in light of the arguments by the State Party of the legislative history, purpose, and application of both Acts and it was found the rule was based on objective and reasonable criteria. United Nations Human Rights Committee, *Mr. Rupert Althammer et al (represented by counsel, Mr. Alexander H.E. Morawa) v. Austria*, Communication No 998/2001 (78<sup>th</sup> session, 2003), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001 at paras. 2.3 and 10.2 (2003). The Committee found that an abolition of household entitlements for retired persons (employees) of the Social Insurance Board was not part of the essential entitlements of retirement benefits. This was found to be justified in times of financial constraints and a legitimate motive of social policy because the result is an increase for the children's benefits. See also United Nations Human Rights Committee, *Rubén Santiago HinostrozaSolís v. Peru*, Communication No. 1016/2001 (86<sup>th</sup> session, 2006), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/86/D/1016/2001 (2006).
- 95 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, *General Comment 5: General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child* (34<sup>th</sup> session, 2003), U.N. Doc CRC/GC/2003/5 at paras. 32-33 (2003).

review standard to individual accommodation requirements, systemic, societal barriers to equality facing people with disabilities, and to failures by States to realise self-standing ESC rights of persons with disabilities. The jurisprudence emerging from these considerations will be of tremendous value to the CESCR as it wrestles with its own historically important mandate.

At the same time, it will be important for social rights advocates and claimants to bring to these other procedures the substantive and transformative approach to reasonableness that has been developed in ESC rights jurisprudence and incorporated into Article 8(4) of the OP-ICESCR. The adoption of the OP-ICESCR represents an historic convergence of civil and political with ESC rights practice, which draws on developments in diverse fora and from domestic, regional and international sources. The reasonableness standard under the OP-ICESCR will draw nourishment from many sources, and hopefully sprout and take root in many places. What is most critical, however, is that reasonableness be given life and content through the hearing of ESC rights claims themselves, and that it be contoured to the broad purposes and transformative aspirations of the ICESCR as these find a place to be heard and given meaning through local struggles for dignity and human rights.